of mere chance. Our emotions are only part of the general tendency to the maintenance of life which can be discerned in every living substance. The purposiveness of our psyche in relation to the maintenance of life is in principle the same as we meet again and again in anatomy and physiology, in phylogenesis and ontogenesis. This essential sameness has been sensed more or less consciously in the natural sciences, but in recent times has been hardly taken account of. The mechanistic theory which denies the identity of the psychical and the biological activities, not only forbids, quite groundlessly, any scientific consideration of the psyche and bans psychology, which is a branch of natural science, to the mystic realm, but must also fail to achieve a deeper understanding of biology as a whole. Vitalism is equally in error. . . . Future research must proceed from the recognition that " the riddle of life " and " the riddle of the soul " are one and the same, that biology and psychology throw light from different angles on the one problem.'

The question, then, is: Granted the reality of the engrams as Bleuler postulates them, will they account for, will they explain, in principle, all the teleological activities of organisms ? And since, as Bleuler himself insists, it is in the sphere of behaviour that teleological activity is most clearly manifested, we have to ask : Does Bleuler's theory provide adequate explanation of such intelligent goal-seeking as men and animals outwardly display ? For it is by analogy with these activities that he would explain the inner vital processes of tissue regulation,

&c.

The problem is really the old problem, which has been fought out at length in psychology: Can the principle of associative memory (operating as the revival or repetition of past impressions or states or processes, upon the